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| liben |
 Posted: Sat Apr 29, 2006 8:23 pm |
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Joined: 30 Mar 2006
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Location: University of Chicago
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GETZ #4, rev.–WHAT HAPPENED IN THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS?
Donald N. Levine (aka Liben Gebre Etyopiya)
1. Two million Ethiopian infants were added to the population of the poorest country on the planet–thereby guaranteeing continued misery for vast numbers in a largely agricultural economy affected by massive deforestation, soil erosion, erratic rainfall, diminished land per person, and epidemic diseases.
As Sahlu Haile, Packard Foundation senior program advisor, wrote in a prize-winning report, population growth will drive Ethiopia's future: infrastructure and agricultural land cannot support its growing numbers, so huge numbers are trapped in vicious cycles of poverty, disease, and hunger. The government developed a policy to educate girls to avoid early marriage and early childbearing and to support family planning, but inaction, disinterest, and ambivalence of senior officials has stood in the way of implementing it. And United States agencies have been inhibited by rules against the promotion of family planning. Rural Ethiopia has become, as Professor Mesfin Wolde Mariam explained more than three decades ago, a famine-generating system
2. In Gawls, Afar region, the skull of a small human ancestor, which could be a missing link between extinct Homo erectus and modern man, was discovered along with several stone tools and fossilized animals.
Sileshi Semaw of Indiana University, director of the Gona Paleoanthropo-
logical Research Project, reports that the hominid cranium "is very close to the appearance of the anatomically modern human."
3. Universities were expanded and plans to erect enlarge the system of higher education to twenty-two universities were announced.
The expansions are coming at the expense both of quality of the universities and the health of the secondary school system, and with no resources in sight to move toward realization of the more ambitious plans.
4. Hapte-Selassie Tafesse was offered the site of the Jubilee Palace in which to create a national museum of Ethiopian paintings and other treasures.
Same old jovial Haptos. We reconnected joyously after forty-five years. When I mentioned my visit to prisoners at Kaliti, he quipped: "Well, I was in prison for eight years and you didn't even visit me once!"
5. Much new housing appears to have sprung up in and around Addis Ababa.
It gives the impression of a burgeoning if not booming economy, a picture that contrasts with the image of dreary depressed Addis one sometimes gets from abroad. Critics note that the housing was constructed hastily and contains functional flaws.
6. Political elements competitive with the EPRDF regime transformed themselves from a vast number of splinter groups into a system of three major parties.
In Adama (Nazret) in 1992 I found two political party offices side by side, both saying they stood for Ethiopian national unity. "Wow! That is great!" I thought. "But why aren't you two together?" There was no difference at all in what they stood for, the staffers explained–only a clash between the personalities of the party heads. It seemed that those who favored genuine Ethiopian unity could never get united. But now most of them have.
7. The Ethiopian polity was transformed from a one-party state to a multi-party democratizing system.
I am trying to think of one other polity where such a transformation took place with the same party leaders staying on in power. Of course there were severe bumps along the way, and injustices whose pain will linger for a long time.
8. Following protracted antagonism, leaders of Government and opposition parties met on October 2, 2005 for a series of talks that could pave the way for elected members of the latter to enter Parliament. They met every day for some five days and were approaching agreement, then the talks broke down.
It's amazing to think how close they were to a solution that could have averted the November killings and all the subsequent turmoil. Still, it shows the potential for reconciliation and Ethiopia's resurrection.
9. The world's first multi-disciplinary peace center was established in Awassa, offering regular training in aikido, the martial art of peace; workshops in conflict resolution; training in nonviolent communication; and a library of literature in Amharic and English on peace studies.
Story to come.
10. Two million Ethiopian infants were added to the population of the poorest country on the planet–thereby guaranteeing continued misery for vast numbers in a largely agricultural economy affected by massive deforestation, soil erosion, erratic rainfall, diminished land per person, and epidemic diseases.
As Sahlu Haile, Packard Foundation senior program advisor, wrote in a prize-winning report, population growth will drive Ethiopia's future: infrastructure and agricultural land cannot support its growing numbers, so huge numbers are trapped in vicious cycles of poverty, disease, and hunger. The government developed a policy to educate girls to avoid early marriage and early childbearing and to support family planning, but inaction, disinterest, and ambivalence of senior officials has stood in the way of implementing it. And United States agencies have been inhibited by rules against the promotion of family planning. . Rural Ethiopia has become, as Professor Mesfin Wolde Mariam explained more than three decades ago, a famine-generating system. |
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| Dessalegn |
| Posted: Thu May 04, 2006 2:40 pm |
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Joined: 04 Apr 2006
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Dear Dr. Levine,
In light of your emphasis on population issues, I think this article discussing rural and urban fertility in Ethiopia may be of interest.
The article seems to confirm that the conventional wisdom of the implications on land policy and the pace of urbanization on population apply in Ethiopia.
I believe that the variables that you listed--population, massive deforestation, soil erosion, erratic rainfall, (climate change and desertification), diminished land per person, and epidemic diseases--are the major reason why Ethiopia does not have the luxury of waiting for good governance.
Nor can Ethiopia afford to indulge in novel or experimental ideologically-driven policies on land and 'revolutionary democracy'.
Nor, for that matter, can the donor community afford to be lulled into complacency by the current calm before the long-term storm.
I would be interested in your views.
Dessalegn |
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| liben |
| Posted: Sun May 07, 2006 12:10 am |
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Joined: 30 Mar 2006
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Location: University of Chicago
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Selam Ato Dessalegn,
Warm thanks for your thoughtful attention to all my posts and for the article by Yohannes Kinfu. The short answer is that i concur with every word in your response of May 4.
A rather different response came from another reader who wrote:
>Professor Levine,
>Why is it population increase for Ethiopia such a concern? There are many counties with higher density of population than Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s problem is the dysfunctional political system, not the population. When democracy takes hold, the country will certainly prosper. I strongly disagree with the premise that population growth is a problem by itself.<
In brief: ETHIOPIA'S DEMOGRAPHIC EXPLOSION IS OF SUCH AN ORDER OF MAGNITUDE THAT IF SERIOUS STEPS ARE NOT TAKEN IN THE NEXT HALF DOZEN YEARS IT MAY WELL BE TOO LATE TO AVOID CATASTROPHE.
I in tend to devote all of Getz #6 to this pressing issue. Getz #5, on Toigrayawinet, will be posted shortly.
Akbariwot,
Liben |
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| admin |
| Posted: Mon May 22, 2006 10:15 pm |
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Joined: 28 Mar 2006
Posts: 40
Location: Heart and Mind
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Originaly posted by Dessalegn
Originaly Posted: 21 Apr 2006 04:38 am
Dear Dr. Levine,
I strongly disagree with your assertion that the Ethiopian polity has been transformed into a multi-party democracy. And so do many EPRDF leaders, who often say the country is ‘democratizing’, implying it’s not yet a democracy, even in the Third World sense.
A country where dissent is criminalized, the bounds for free speech are extremely tight and determined by the ruling party, where human rights violations are rampant, and where the dividing line between ruling party and government is invisible, cannot be called a democracy! Perhaps, much too charitably, ‘a polity moving towards democracy,’ but certainly not a democracy.
Personally, I can tell you that I much preferred the two years before the election than the situation today. At least there was some free speech and freedom of association. I could speak freely of the problems with society, with the EPRDF’s woeful record, of the benefits of democracy, and so on. I could urge people to vote, as I did, explaining that they ought to take responsibility for their own destinies, that they could make a difference. Today, if I were to go to Ethiopia, I would be afraid to even be mistakenly identified as an opposition supporter. Fear – the hallmark of dictatorships – has blanketed Ethiopia. No, this is no democracy.
I’d also like to comment on your observations about the boom in construction. You have rightly said that the construction gives the impression of a booming economy. According to the IMF, Ethiopia’s income per capita has risen just 1.1% annually during EPRDF rule, and the trend is declining (1). According to the World Bank, the level of poverty in Ethiopia has not changed during EPRDF rule (2). These dire statistics despite a generous combination of aid and debt forgiveness, and a boost from moving from a command economy to a semi-competitive economy. So in the recent past, although anecdotal evidence such as the construction of the Addis Ababa Ring Road and an extensive road network throughout the country, dams, and other visible brick and mortar projects seem to suggest strong economic growth, the facts show otherwise.
Similarly, today, the construction boom today cannot be extrapolated to the economy as a whole. It is likely a concerted effort by the Party to give the impression of a booming economy.
Of course, population has had a big part to play in the stagnating economy, given low labour productivity. But how is it that the 3% annual population growth rate has remained unchanged for fifteen years? Assuming the EPRDF has had the will to tackle the problem, it remains that reducing population growth requires some sort of connection between the government and the people, as it is to a large extent a matter of education and moral suasion. This the EPRDF does not have. A public education campaign conducted by a repressive EPRDF has not and cannot work. Yet another reason for the EPRDF to end repression and establish some sort of rapport with the people.
Reminds me of the constant EPRDF refrain: “Our policies are sound. Their implementation is not.” Speaks volumes.
(1) Income per capita annual growth, 1.1%, and crop yields, 0.4%. See “Ethiopia – Scaling Up”, Finance and Development, Vol. 42 No.3, IMF, September 2005, (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2005/09/andrews.htm)
(2) See page iii in Ethiopia - Well-Being and Poverty in Ethiopia, World Bank, 2005 (http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS_IBank_Servlet?pcont=details&eid=000160016_20050920094758) |
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| Costantinos |
| Posted: Sat May 27, 2006 2:55 pm |
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Location: Addis Ababa
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Dear Libe Gebre Etyiopia
Thank you once more for your insight on what happened in the past 12 months. I will focus my response on the role of the state and market in Ethiopia's development as it has become customary to blame the weather and population growth (that has ironically driven economic development in many nations --- population seen as a resource and not as a burden) in our developmental deficits.
Indeed the agenda for human development in Ethiopia faces many limitations. On several occasions, I have raised several questions as to whether we have so far been effective in promoting and institutionalising empowerment among our populace, do we have the commitment to professional principles and practices that are said not to be lacking with clear evidence in the internal affairs of many programmes focussing on human development. I have also argued that politicians, development researchers and practitioners do not show sufficient awareness of the difficult socio-political choices facing us if we are to become more involved in addressing the nation’s development challenges.
The points made above regarding the identification of problems of development management apply to the setting of goals and tasks for problem-solving activities. The ‘solutions’, like the ‘challenges’, can be seen in large part as elements, features and effects of state policies that pervaded a century old colonial and bureaucratic history. They have taken shape and come into play as the articulation and operation of particular doctrines. As I submitted earlier "the influence of decades of feudal and militarist legacy over our economic administration and management, that is manifested in an activist impulse which calls for politicians to be highly polemical and combative in their mode of ‘communication', to be sensitive but not particularly responsive to criticism of goals and strategies; shows up in the tendency to offer solutions in tight, formulaic terms, for the most part avoiding the uncertainty of their pluralism, negotiated framing, and to resist the opening up of economic, social and political governance reform aims and purposes for alternative formulations".
The first round of the African renaissance that was launched with the liberation of Africa from shackles of Euro-pean colonialism in the sixties spawned a whole branch of economic theory – development economics. It’s raison d’être – bringing about economic development in poor countries. Because ‘poor countries were intrinsically different from rich ones, they needed a new economic model; different from the modernisation and subject to Marxian depend-ency and alternative modes of production theories. Some even argued that the self-interested, rational individual (homo economicus) could not exist in agrarian-based and predominantly tribal and ethnic societies. Much of this was ill-advised, and economic rationale based on it created developmental states that are fragile, failed or failing.
Instead of the much touted African Renaissance, the result was botched gubernatorial regimes with huge, bankrupt bureaucracies riddled with sleaze, gargantuan budget deficits and unbridled inflation. Failed states therefore bred a new genre of rent-seeking (a phrase coined by economist Gordon Tullock, means cutting a bigger slice of the business rather than expanding the business and trying to make more money without producing more) prebendary state and private sector profiteers.
As opposed to the developmentalists, promoters of new endogenous growth theory argue that there is conditional convergence -- catch-up effect for poor nations to grow faster than the rich ones; if we held constant such factors as fertility rate, human capital and policies (proxied by the share of public spending in GDP). Neo-classical economics underpins that poor countries grow faster than richer ones as there are diminishing returns on capital for the rich. Nonetheless, since, in reality, all demographic, policy and human capital factors are not constant, absolute conver-gence may not happen. Hence, as we enter the new millennium, African nations are under pressure to open up mar-kets and develop well sequenced new policies. South Africa, Nigeria, Uganda, Egypt, Tunisia… to name a few seem to make a big difference on how well such convergence has worked. National business, entrepreneurship and broadly free-market policies and secure property rights have raised their growth rates. Hernando de Soto, a Peruvian economist advocates establishing formal property rights for the poor to help them rapidly escape from poverty. In books such as the other path and the mystery of capital, he argued that, in developing countries, capitalism will thrive in the long run only if legal systems change so that most of the people feel that the law is on their side. Lower public spending relative to GDP is usually associated with higher economic growth. For the poorest nations to catch up, their chances of entering the development round table are maximised by policies that give a greater role to competition and incentives. Rules and institutions that underpin effective economic and so-cial governance are crucial.
Increasing economic growth is achieved by making markets work more efficiently. The eighties championed sup-ply-side policies by attacking Keynesian demand management; as pumping up demand without functioning markets simply led to higher inflation. Economic growth increases only when markets were able to operate more freely. Thus they pursued policies of deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation and encouraged free trade and to reduce unemployment, they tried to increase the efficiency of the jobs market by cutting income tax rates and attacking legal impediments to labour market flexibility. While during the eighties most governments in the Tiger economies started to reverse these policies and undo the damage they had done by introducing developmentalist and statist economic models; African countries have remained hung-up on developmentalist model.
The explicit concept of capacity building for good governance that current international initiatives operate in Ethiopia may be consistent with goals of "empowerment" of indigenous communities and individuals, of enhancing local insti-tutional and human capacities. The initiatives, nevertheless, tend to work toward these goals in narrow economic and technocratic terms; equating technocratic rationality and capacity with totality of institutional purposefulness and strength. This brings up the fundamental weaknesses of these crises of development paradigms that are not in the answers they provide but in the new questions they engender and challenge us with. There is con-vincing evidence that societies evolved complex and sophisticated social and managerial mechanism to exist relatively comfortably even in rigorous economic conditions. ‘Development economics' of the past few decades has brought fundamentals changes to indigenous production systems. These have meant new definitions of vulnerability and a loss of effectiveness by traditional social managerial mechanisms.
We can argue convincingly that certain measures implemented by strong economic or social powers do start socio-economic processes which have a dynamic of their own and which interact with natural processes in a very strong way. Nonetheless, their role has been cruelly tested in the famines, poverty and diseases they have rendered the continent to due to the implicit dearth of civic education training as a key component of many development programmes and projects. It is the fundamental contention that civic education - learning about and appreciating one's rights, duties, obligations and responsibilities as a citizen and the immediate rules, laws and governance structures within which one exercises citizenship is the first and fundamental step in development participation. Without it, we will make no sig-nificant headway neither with our new paradigms and strategies for development nor with our pendulous lurch to-wards democratic governance. Democracy could easily degenerate into anarchy if participation in citizenship is not viewed as a critical factor in both socio-economic development and democratic governance.
Civic participation is, hence, construed as self empowerment which comes about as an exercise of collective will on the part of the people themselves based on personal and group conscientisation that comes as a natural result of critical thinking and a community survival ethic that transcends the routine material goals of every community member. Francis Fukuyama has once observed that ‘the recognition that individuals seek as individuals: the chief psychological imperative underling democracy is the desire for universal and equal recognition', which `is a com-pletely non-economic source of motivation. It is the desire for recognition that can provide the missing link be-tween economic development and democracy. The quest for popular participation is as old as hierarchical power struc-tures. The two have always been in opposition. Popular participation is an effort at redistributing power in a socio-entity where there are production relationships between people'. It aims at changing local culture and evolving new norms in communities and societies that have `successfully' managed and elaborated a modus vivendi with their envi-ronment for many centuries.
Liben! keep the dialogue forum open to all Ethiopians and those who consider this ancient nation their beloved home.
Costantinos |
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