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| liben |
 Posted: Mon Jun 19, 2006 5:05 am |
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Moderator
Joined: 30 Mar 2006
Posts: 40
Location: University of Chicago
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REPLY TO A REAL CITIZEN
Donald N. Levine
Tibebu Bikele's gracious and courageous letter poses two questions: 1) What accounts for an apparent shift in my views–from being a critic of the Government of Ethiopia to being a shimagle? 2) How could I overlook the Ethiopian court system's lack of independence?
Regarding shimgilena: I have tried consistently over the past fifty years to function as a mediator. My enduring effort has been to use the tools of a sociologist to help resolve constructively the conflicts inherent in modernizing a multiethnic patrimonial society. What I said on Chicago Public Radio last summer formed part of that effort, since the Government actions I criticized seemed directed precisely against consensual democratization. I certainly stick by the complaints I made then–against the Government's outrageous killing of civilian demonstrators in June; its arbitrary expulsion of representatives of three US nonpartisan democratizing organizations six weeks before the May 15 elections; its being shut off from what so much of the public felt about them; and its record of repression, reflecting a Leninist organization in which party cadres supervene ordinary government operations.
That said, I agree that I exhibited a shift–not of intention, but in tone and emphasis–since last summer. Informed views necessarily shift as new information and analyses are learned and as events evolve. After summer the situation changed. Following the incarceration of CUD leaders and journalists, the Ethiopian public became polarized and tense. As a long-time student of social conflict, I knew that without pointed interventions, the situation could escalate destructively. Denouncing, after all, is easy in a free country or behind an internet; I felt obliged to search for ways to resolve Ethiopia's political crisis.
Encouraged to become a working shimagle by my friend the noted musician Zeleke Gessesse, I offered my services as a conflict mediator and wrote a mission statement to that effect (posted as "My call for shemgilena . . ." on this site). Since in January I was already on my way to establish a nonviolence learning center in Awassa and attend a scholarly conference in Aksum, I spent several days in Addis. I spoke to President Girma, Prime Minister Meles, and other government officials. I spent a day at Kaliti prison, speaking with three groups of detainees. I spoke with numerous other Ethiopians and foreign diplomats. And every day I learned more, without ever pretending to do more than scratch the surface.
One thing I learned was that a number of crucial issues were conspicuously absent from public discourse due to the preoccupation of so much attention to the aftermath of the May 15 Election, issues that I resolved to take up in a series of short statements about famine and chronic hunger, environmental degradation, the future of the Oromo, and Ethiopia's relation to Israel. Regarding the election I learned that although there were verified irregularities in the polling process noted by the Carter and EU observers, there was legitimate doubt regarding the final outcome of the election. I learned of irregularities in the conduct of some of the election observers, but also in the conduct of some of the CUD plaintiffs in contesting electoral results. I learned about new concrete steps being taken by the Government to advance democratization and economic development. I learned that the decision about entering Parliament was extremely difficult for the elected opposition MP's and for their supporters. I learned that the opposition had taken a truly statesmanlike stand in agreeing to enter Parliament without demanding a review of the 299 contested seats. I learned of the silence of the religious leaders in the face of the burning crisis provoked by the imprisonment of CUD leaders and free journalists.
Above all, I learned that in late October, CUD and EUDF leaders were in daily communication with the Prime Minister and others. They were approaching an agreement that would have avoided the subsequent demonstration, killings, and incarcerations when a slight shift occurred. After a party at the home of Berhanu Nega, two CUD leaders, Professor Yaqob Haile Mariam and Engineer Gizatchew Shiferaw Belay, were reportedly accosted, harassed, and threatened by Government security personnel, and had guns pointed at their heads. The two gentlemen, fearing for their lives, drove home at once. The opposition leaders felt betrayed; they took it as evidence that the Government was not to be trusted. They reacted by shifting into meshefet mode and terminating the dialogue. On the other hand, there was also a claim that internal dynamics within the CUD initiated the breakdown. That whole fateful episode needs to be investigated further. In any case, since many CUD members supported the breakdown of communication fully aware of its dangerous consequences, I concluded that both sides–if not equally–contributed to that fateful deterioration, even though each side blamed only the other. This is what usually occurs in community conflicts once escalation starts.
The CUD leaders and the Government officials both argue eloquently on behalf of upholding the rule of law. The former maintain that their aim is not to gain power but to secure precedents for democratic parliamentary norms. The Prime Minister defends the Government's decision not to grant bail to the prisoners on grounds that the charges against them are not bailable. Over the summer, I learned, PM Meles worked hard to get the CUD MP's to enter Parliament, and he advised them that if they did not they would lose immunity from criminal charges. He then insisted that the judicial process run its course.
Let us now review my words that upset Ato Tibebu: “Some of those who refused to take their seats in parliament are now in prison. Insofar as anything they did was actually in violation of Law, I believe it is important to respect the forms of a systematic, independent–and, we hope, speedy–judicial review of their deeds as a step toward advancing the role of an independent judiciary in this country . . .”
That passage does not say anywhere that an independent judiciary already exists. To be sure, there may well be more independence in the court system already than Ato Tibebu implies (something about which little secure knowledge exists), but consider that Judge Yalew Teshome's judgment of June 9, 2005 criticized the National Election Board for acting "not only contrary to the Law but also contrary to the Board's own word . . . that it will not issue provisional announcements under whatever guise." Even so, how could anyone make a blanket claim about an independent judiciary when the executive branch can appoint and dismiss court officials at will, as for example the dismissal of a dozen federal judges and more than half of the Addis Ababa Regional court judges in the 1990s? How could anyone claim an independent judiciary exists when judges who voice opinions considered out of line can be in trouble, as when Judge Bertukan Mideksa, whose judicial order to release Ato Siye Abrha was overturned by executive fiat, was allegedly denied due promotion, or the case of Judge Amir Yusuf of Harar, an impeccably well-trained and highly responsible judge, who was reportedly dismissed from his position for voicing some opinions of which the Government disapproved.
The root of these problems is structural. For one thing, the court system does not have its own budget. For another, the Prime Minister holds authority to appoint judges. What is more, lower-level decisions are routinely subjected to intervention and review by higher-level courts, rather than being referred to them through an appeal process.
Problems due to this structure, in place for more than a decade, were aggravated when, following Judge Bertukan's decision in the Siye case, Parliament passed hasty legislation that gave the Government the right to hold without bail anyone accused of corruption. That wipes out the last vestige of independence on the part of the court system. (What is more, it threatens the economy by instilling fear throughout the business community.)
Again I say that we must respect the forms of a systematic, independent, speedy completion of their trial "as a step toward advancing the role of an independent judiciary." I chose those words deliberately in order to encourage the Government to move forward toward a system in which a judiciary functions autonomously. To be sure, some problems in those trials have already surfaced: translations from Amharic into English are reportedly below any reasonable standard, and the case has already dragged on far too long. If legitimate procedures are not respected by the Government, I expect that domestic and international observers will get the word out quickly, and I shall be among the first to voice disapproval. I also fear that if it is not seen as independent, more stress will be placed on an increasingly vulnerable situation in the country.
But if the trial is reasonably fair, then its success could be joined with other steps being taken toward reform of the judicial system, the last in the series of four efforts at democratic institution-building. A package on reform of Parliamentary procedures seems to be moving forward and there is promise of its approval by the full Parliament prior to its adjournment later this month. Donors have completed and provided to the Speaker of Parliament a study on regulation of the media in the UK, Canada, Germany and India. The report addresses issues related to freedom of expression as well as the responsibility of journalists to provide accurate information. The Speaker has indicated that the report will be distributed to opposition leaders as soon as it is finalized in preparation for both discussions within the political dialogue as well as hearings in the Parliament. The National Electoral Board is currently developing a plan to address weaknesses identified by another study, which include chronic understaffing and a lack of effective management structures. And a fourth pillar of the democratization process, the institution of an independent judiciary, could become the subject of a fourth initiative.
My observations remain fallible and subject to correction, as do those of anyone who attempts to work on public issues. What is absolutely clear and irrefutable is the value of open dialogue, and the pressing need to take small steps to support that dialogue in contemporary Ethiopia. For encouraging that process in so forthright a manner, Tibebu Bekelu surely belongs to that group I long ago described as filsafi ye-honut etyopyawiyan–the best Amharic we could come up with for "creative Ethiopians." I hope that he and others will keep the conversations going. |
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| Costantinos |
| Posted: Wed Jun 21, 2006 5:52 am |
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Joined: 31 Mar 2006
Posts: 12
Location: Addis Ababa
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Prof Levin’s submission on ETHIOPIA IN 2006: CALL FOR A NEW DIRECTION underpins several points: (1) that the May 15 election marked a dramatic step forward on the road toward a democratic society in Ethiopia. Regime and populace alike deserve credit for that unprecedented accomplishment. All concerned should pause, breathe deeply, and savor that historic achievement; (2) reversing this (Ethiopian) conflict could mark an extraordinary step forward for Ethiopia and enable it to return to a position of leadership in Africa, much as did the resolution of apartheid in South Africa; (3) that disputes about the election results and related demonstrations and violence have deprived the country from enjoying the fruits of that achievement. One cannot agree more.
We need to articulate responses and find answers to questions that arise out of the grueling impasse that the Ethiopian poor are dearly paying for. Does political contestation enter electoral processes in Ethiopia as an external ideology, constructing and deploying its concepts in sterile abstraction from the immediacies of indigenous traditions, beliefs and values? Furthermore do ideas of political competition come into play in total opposition to, or in cooperation with historic Ethiopian values and sentiments?
As Prof Levin submits, political “disputes are currently being addressed through legal procedures. Whatever the outcome of those court proceedings, the more deep-lying issues that led to those volatile disputes need to be addressed if the country is to regain confidence and move forward with a vision of future possibilities.” Hence we need to look if shimgilena recurrently augurs basic community conflict management practices that have endured to this day in Ethiopia’s two millennia church history -- where the voluntary problem-solving and decision-making methods most often employed are (1) conciliation, a neutral third party to communicate separately with disputing parties; (2) negotiation a voluntary process in which parties meet face to face to reach a mutually acceptable resolution of the issues and (3) mediation which involves the assistance of a neutral third party in a negotiation. This also brings to light some axioms of conflict management and dispute resolution approaches that derive from several basic premises about the nature of conflict, change and power because conflict often serves as an important impetus for positive change.
This is in line with Prof. Levin’s statement that the political parties “argue eloquently on behalf of upholding the rule of law”. Therefore an important premise that successful conflict management relies is on the participation of all legitimate parties or ‘stakeholders’ in a dispute. Power imbalances are virtually always an issue in a negotiation as stronger parties draw the line and weaker parties realize that incumbents are neither monolithic nor adversarial. Hence the determinants that sculpt the conflict management process are
1. What are the political parties’ best alternatives that might be seen as winning strategies as opposed to a negotiated agreement?
2. What are the basic interests of each of the parties involved in the dispute?
3. What are options for solution that could be presented at the negotiation table as winning synergies to all contestants?
4. How can power competition be balanced with some degree of cooperation among the combatants?
5. Can implementation of a mutually agreed settlement be ensured?
As Prof. Levin has articulated very well “despite the upsurge of ethnic politics in the past generation, it is abundantly clear that the bonds of Etyopiyawinet are alive and well. Indeed, they may in many quarters be stronger than ever. I salute the people of Ethiopia for maintaining those bonds and for carrying on with their traditional attachment to justice, their cheerfulness in adversity, and their determination to carry on. I say with all my heart: Idme le-hulatchu, idme le-Etyopiya!!“
Hence we need to see developing capacity for endogenously derived models of alterative conflict management where negotiation training and mediation and conciliation training become the corner stone. It seems we have very little choice as indeed the legal approach assumes a highly developed democratic society that appreciates and abides by the rule of law. Indeed, democracy must actually exist, take definite shape and structure and become a working process, before particular criticisms, claims and demands can be based on it. Thus, in economically and socially compromised societies and polities such as ours, there exist almost overwhelming impediments to democratic development. The legitimacy of the political process underway will depend in important ways on it being perceived as reasonably honest, transparent and accountable. There are also too many instances in our which prove the transcendence of ethno-centrism and narrow linguistic and religious affiliations. Using tools and approaches that other societies have been able to field effectively, a proficient and unswerving civil society leadership and not ‘correct timing’ of power seizure is of the essence can mitigate conditions that are hostile to pluralism.
Indeed, by any measure of the term, Ethiopia and neighboring states in the Horn Of Africa are, once more, at cross roads; having set-forth on a long journey to achieve the paragons of pluralist politics that most developed nations have taken for granted. With seven million displaced peoples, the Horn outmodes all forms of humanitarian crises the world has ever seen. Our recent political crises have also dominated the headlines of world papers and engaged ordinary citizens, the diaspora and donors in an unprecedented political activism; resulting in the incarceration of the opposition, cancellation of aid and deep cleavage among its peoples. The way out of this quagmire is to launch a civic conflict management process that must be proposed by Ethiopian civic leaders in and outside Ethiopia.
Indubitably, there is no more compelling rationale nor an added urgency to civic engagement in this task. The effort nevertheless requires that one pays careful attention not only to specific aims and objectives pursued by the agenda of the combatants -- the distinctive interests and concepts that determine the domain of their activities -- but also the framework of thought, discourse and action through which the political contestants translate these specific organizational elements into a broader pattern of ideas and apply them commonly to the democratic development agenda in Ethiopia and The Horn of Africa at large.
Costantinos |
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